Feedback manipulation and learning in games by Masiliunas, A.
  
 
Feedback manipulation and learning in games
Citation for published version (APA):
Masiliunas, A. (2015). Feedback manipulation and learning in games. Maastricht: Maastricht University.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2015
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Feedback Manipulation and Learning in Games
by Aidas Masiliu¯nas
Summary
Chapters in this thesis investigate how manipulations that affect the type of feedback
but not the set of equilibria influence the learning process and the long-run outcomes of a
game. Chapter 2 reports the results of an experiment in which the reliability of feedback
is manipulated by reducing the variability in opponent’s actions and in the payoff function,
leading to dramatically improved convergence rates and reduced behavioural variation in a
contest game. A theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 specifies conditions under which
sophisticated players would be willing to manipulate the feedback observed by myopic players
by taking a suboptimal action in a repeated coordination game. An experiment in Chapter
4 varies the cost of action disclosure and shows that higher costs discourage action disclosure
and lead to incomplete feedback that prevents transitions to an efficient equilibrium.
Chapter 2 uses a Tullock contest as an example of a game in which game theory fails to
make accurate predictions: Nash equilibrium is chosen only 7% of the time while dominated
strategies are chosen more than half of the time. A common view is that the low explanatory
power of a Nash equilibrium results from the failure of assumptions about risk-neutral and
self-interested behavior. However, deviations from theoretical predictions may be a result of
complexities that make optimization difficult for boundedly rational players. Understanding
the source of the discrepancy between choices and theoretical predictions would point to
the correct way to address this problem. If the discrepancy arises because of non-standard
preferences, the problem of low explanatory power could be solved by adding such preferences
to the theory. But if the discrepancy results from bounded rationality, it may be desirable to
introduce interventions that would enable players to learn to behave in an optimal way.
One factor that may limit the opportunities to learn in contests is noisy feedback arising
from a stochastic payoff function. If there were no stochastic elements in the payoff function,
dominated strategies would always provide low earnings and given enough time players should
learn to avoid such strategies. In standard contests, however, payoffs are stochastic due
to strategic uncertainty—changes in the actions chosen by other players—and due to non-
strategic uncertainty generated by a randomization device. In a 2x2 design we reduce both
types of uncertainty: strategic uncertainty is lowered by matching players to computers who
play the same action for a certain number of rounds and uncertainty about the prize allocation
is lowered by paying the expected value instead of playing a lottery. We find that when no
uncertainty is present, the frequency of dominated actions decreases dramatically and the
median response is almost always equal to the theoretical prediction. When either type of
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uncertainty is present, choices are very different from the theoretical prediction and dominated
strategies are chosen more than half of the time.
Feedback may be manipulated by the experimenter, but it also depends on the actions
taken by other players. If feedback affects behavior, a strategic player may therefore attempt
to alter the future behavior of other group members by manipulating their observed feedback.
A certain action could therefore be chosen just for the information it conveys to other group
members rather than for the immediate profit it generates. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 use
theory and experiments to test whether such strategic motives could explain deviations from
an inefficient equilibrium in N-person critical mass games. In these games non-equilibrium
outcomes are observed much less frequently than in contests, as typically all groups rapidly
coordinate on a common action. However, a social dilemma arises if play converges to an
inefficient equilibrium: any unilateral deviation from an inefficient equilibrium would decrease
deviant’s immediate utility, even though a Pareto improvement could be achieved by collective
action. Inefficient equilibrium persists because staying in it is optimal given the belief that
others will stay too. If beliefs are the core of the problem, players who anticipate the belief
formation process may maximize their earnings by deviating from an inefficient equilibrium
because a decrease in immediate payoffs is more than compensated by the benefits of efficient
coordination in the future. Chapter 3 shows that under certain conditions self-interested
strategic players would be willing to deviate from an inefficient equilibrium. Chapter 4 tests
whether players in an experiment are actually motivated by such strategic considerations and
whether transitions to an efficient equilibrium are more frequent when strategic teaching is
made easier by reducing the cost of action disclosure.
Chapter 3 proposes a solution concept that combines a learning model based on ficti-
tious play and the concept of a Nash equilibrium by assuming that some players are myopic
and update beliefs based on observed history while others are sophisticated and correctly
anticipate the actions of all other players. The proposed solution concept is a combination
of sophisticated player strategies that are optimal given the learning process of the myopic
players and the strategies chosen by other sophisticated players. A combination of learning
from history and strategic reasoning produces action paths in which sophisticated players
find it optimal to use strategic teaching, and the existence of such action paths depends both
on the history observed by myopic players and on the length of the reasoning horizon of
sophisticated players.
Chapter 4 tests whether deviations from an inefficient equilibrium are motivated by
strategic considerations and whether transitions to an efficient equilibrium are more likely
if information about one’s action can be provided at a low cost. In an experiment players
could disclose their action to other group members by paying a cost that was varied across
treatments. Players who only care about immediate payoffs would not be willing to pay the
cost because disclosure provides no immediate benefits, but strategic players may do so if they
expect that a disclosed action increases the chances of a transition to the efficient equilibrium.
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Data shows that many players are willing to pay to reveal their actions, especially when the
costs are low, but only after choosing to deviate from an inefficient equilibrium. When disclo-
sure costs are low, players classified as more farsighted more often deviate from an inefficient
equilibrium and disclose this action, providing further support for the strategic teaching hy-
pothesis. Higher disclosure costs reduce the tendency to reveal actions, increasing strategic
uncertainty and making transitions to an efficient equilibrium much less likely. In fact, no
group moves to the efficient equilibrium when action disclosure costs are high, but half of the
groups do so when the costs are low. Belief learning seems to be the most likely explanation
for this treatment difference: stated beliefs generally move in accordance to the predictions
of weighted fictitious play, but players who do not disclose their actions are perceived in a
similar way to those who choose the inefficient action. Lack of feedback resulting from high
action disclosure costs seems to introduce frictions into the learning process, reducing the
frequency of transitions to the efficient equilibrium.
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